CHAPTER III

CONCEPTS FOR THE STUDY OF
IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY

This chapter is devoted to exploring how ideology and self-interest influence the formulation of public policy. As we observed earlier, in seeking explanations of how decision-makers such as members of Congress formulate policy, self-interest is the first explanation to which most journalists and many political scientists turn. There are exceptions such as public policy for abortion or freedom of speech, that appear influenced primarily by ideology, but generally economic self-interest and other types of self-interest appear to be most important.

Self-Interest and Public Policy

Most issues have self-interested groups on all sides. Sometimes policy initiatives are originated by such groups and then taken up by ideologues. In other instances, initiatives appear to originate with the ideologues. In some cases, self-interested groups can also be viewed as ideological. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has self-interest as part of its name, but the organization also has an ideological component.

Scholarly studies and journalistic descriptions of interest groups hint at a notion that public policy is what in vector analysis is called the resultant of forces—a kind of average of the directions of group policies and the power behind them. In this conception governmental policy makers are viewed as little more than the objects of interest group pulling and hauling. Compromise is a critical part of this process unless one side is overwhelmingly stronger than the other. The Holy Grail of interest group studies is a way to gauge the relative power of interest groups to calculate the resultant of forces, but interest group strength is based on too many difficult to measure factors (e.g., number of group members, group wealth and/or reputation, intensity of group feeling) for such calculations to be feasible. Nevertheless, politicians and journalists with especially sensitive antennae can approximate such
computations on a case by case basis.

When self-seeking interest groups originate initiatives (policy departures or attempts to nullify existing policies), those initiatives may have entirely self-seeking motives (to the degree that we can detect motivation) or mixtures of self-interest and ideology. When ideologues originate initiatives, observers may assume that the motivation is ideology, but self-interested groups usually attach themselves to pro or anti-initiative ideological positions. Whatever the ratio of self-interest and ideology, if the initiative reaches the national stage (measured by an event such as its appearance on the front pages or editorial pages of major newspapers or hearings in a congressional committee), it will have been adopted by liberals or conservatives and opposed by the other side (although areas of consensus often exist), and there will usually be interest groups for and against the initiative. Also, even purely self-interested groups frequently frame arguments on behalf of their initiatives in language designed to show that their initiatives are intended to benefit the public interest and that any disproportionate benefit accruing to the group is accidental. Ideology is the language of political ideals for the principled and unprincipled.

Particular interest groups tend to ally with liberals (e.g., most labor unions) and others with conservatives (e.g., many businesses). And, temporary rifts sometimes develop between interest groups and their ideological allies. For example, the New York Times is sometimes sharply critical of labor unions and the Wall Street Journal often disagrees with particular businesses. These usually temporary fissures often reveal the faux ideology behind interest group image making, but they can also expose weaknesses in ideological initiatives including inconsistency between ideological theory and a public policy being espoused.

**Ideology and Public Policy**

We saw in the preceding chapter that liberalism and conservatism are often studied by examining the thoughts of theorists. This approach is appropriate and important. Liberalism and conservatism are complex bundles of ideas that have changed substantially over time, and they deserve to be thoroughly explored, but most such
treatments by modern theorists are isolated from the ideologies’ policy implications. The public policy import of a given strand of an ideology is often not explained, and many modern theorists, absorbed in developing often subtle concepts, display little interest in making connections to public policy except in the form of superficial examples. We need barometers and models of liberalism and conservatism that simplify these ideologies in ways that allow us to study their changes over time and the public policy implications of those changes, but without losing important detail. Although we seek to avoid reliance on the vague guidance provided by theorists and historians of ideology, our simplifications must be consistent with main themes of their work to the degree that such themes can be discerned, and our models must also be consistent with the sense of what liberalism and conservatism are as reflected in everyday political debate.

**Interest group ratings**

Most of the quantitative studies of ideology described in Chapter I measured the ideological tendencies of members of Congress with a scale provided by the liberal interest group Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Other quantitative studies use similar ratings published by other groups, some of which, like the ADA and the American Conservative Union (ACU), have broad public policy interests. Ratings by such groups as the National Rifle Association are more specialized. Applied to Congress as most of them are, these rating systems involve selecting roll call votes on issues important to the organization, and then for each legislator dividing the number of pro-organization votes by the total number of important votes. Most rating systems result in a single number that summarizes a member of Congress’ ideological position for a given time period (usually one year) and allow a ranking from most to least supportive of the group’s position. While very useful especially in quantitative studies of ideology and public policy, this sort of reduction by its nature misses important strands of ideology and ideological change.

There are subtle biases built into congressional ratings published by the ADA, ACU, and other organizations that further limit their
utility for objective studies of ideology. In particular, votes selected for inclusion in their analyses tend to highlight or intensify the differences between liberals and conservatives (Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman, & Feld 1999, 98). Still, it is probably fair to say that most members of Congress agree with their ADA scores. The senators from California who occupy the upper (liberal) reaches of the ADA scale and the senators from Alabama near the bottom portray themselves as liberals and conservatives, respectively.

Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal approach ideology in congressional roll call votes much differently than those who use organizational ratings. This is immediately noticeable in the Poole-Rosenthal definition of ideology: “voting is ideological when positions are predictable across a wide set of issues.” (Poole & Rosenthal 2007, 3) In other words, they define ideology as birds of a feather flocking together without specifying the meaning of the phrase “of a feather.” (p. 219) They show little interest in the intellectual or policy content of ideology. As we noted in Chapter I, this is apparent from the examples they provide to illustrate their definition of ideological voting: “Someone who favors higher minimum wages is also likely to favor lower defense spending, affirmative action programs, higher capital gains taxes, and so on.” (Poole & Rosenthal 2007, 3) Why legislators favoring these policy positions tend to vote together is not explained. Worse yet, while this generalization is valid in the 2000s, it is not when applied to the 1960s.

We will see throughout this study that many liberal and conservative policy positions have changed significantly in the last half century. John Sides (2011) makes this point with his observation that in the early 1960s bills to end racial segregation and voting discrimination were being considered and were regarded by some as controversial, but by the latter years of the same decade Congress had passed civil rights and voting rights legislation and was debating the virtues and characteristics of what conservatives call forced school bussing. Sides argues that this dramatic policy change is invisible to the Poole and Rosenthal technique. For Sides and for us any
meaningful discussion of ideological change must keep track of public policy specifics.

The primary output of the Poole and Rosenthal approach is a two dimensional plot of a roll call vote with the horizontal axis representing: “the economic left, or prolabor side to the economic right, or pro management.” (p. 219) We will find that there is much more to the left-right spectrum regarding business and economics than pro-labor and pro-management. The typical vertical axis in a Poole and Rosenthal plot measures opposition to or support of civil rights legislation. Each data point consists of predictions of legislators’ positions relative to one another regarding a vote based on all of their previous votes. Typically, the Poole and Rosenthal (2007, 22, 24) spatial maps lack axis labels or units except for -1.0, -0.5, 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0. For example, in plots of votes on the Panama Canal Treaty and National Science Foundation funding, horizontal and vertical axes are all labeled from -1.0 to 1.0 with no indication what those units mean in the context of these votes except that they show the relative positions of legislators. These axis units do not represent dimensions, correlation coefficients, or any other standard statistical measure. The text describing these two examples adds little to our understanding of what is being measured in either instance.

Poole and Rosenthal often place quotation marks around the word “ideology,” suggesting that they are aware of their non standard usage. For example, they observe that: “‘Ideology,’ as measured by spatial position is...a more powerful explanatory variable than political party.”(1990, 226) They note: “Our alternative procedure...is to view ideal points on specific issues as arising from more general liberal-conservative or ‘ideological’ preferences onto which specific issues, such as minimum wage, are mapped.” (1990, 226)

The Poole and Rosenthal definition of ideological voting as characterized by predictable positions across a wide range of issues could include many extraneous factors such as economic self-interest. They appear to agree with this point when they observe that: “spatial voting [i.e., ideological voting] is not inconsistent with voting on the basis of economic interests. Economic interests, while
difficult to measure, arguably have an important impact on how issues are mapped into the space captured by NOMINATE [their primary computer tool].” (2007, 151-152) In their rebuttal of Kenneth Koford’s critique of their work, Poole and Rosenthal agree that their ideological scale consists of “several different sources” such as “cognitive limitations, restrictions on the agenda, coalitions, and logrolls.” (Koford, Poole, & Rosenthal 1991, 958) If we follow Koford’s argument, ideology, economic self-interest, parties, constituent concerns, and congressional coalitions are also part of the mix (p. 961). Most scholars concerned with the impact of ideology on public policy distinguish among these factors.

Another problem with group ratings and Poole and Rosenthal’s approach is that they represent only those matters that come to a vote on the floor of the House or Senate. For quantitative studies this is acceptable and even desirable, but one point made repeatedly by ideological theorists of all kinds is the difference between the realms of ideological purity and political practicality with its coalition building, compromise, opportunism, self-interest, and sometimes deception. Furthermore, part of the successful practice of politics is preventing specific issues from being placed on the policy-making agenda, rendering them invisible to an interest group rating or Poole and Rosenthal’s analyses (Talbert & Potoski 2002).

**Using editorials**

Newspaper and journal of opinion editorials offer an objective indicator of the content and change of liberal and conservative policy positions and tenets. Furthermore, editorials provide much richer detail than ADA or other organizational scores and greater clarity than Poole and Rosenthal’s results. Our original intention was to sample editorials from two national newspapers widely regarded as conservative and two others seen as liberal, and then to analyze those editorials using a system to be described later. One newspaper for each ideology might have been sufficient, but two would provide control against temporary editorial eccentricities to which even institutions might be prone.

**Selection of newspapers**

The first problem was selecting the newspapers. The choices had
to be limited to publications that are national in scope, perceived by the politically active as consistent in ideological perspective, and published during 1961-2012 and preferably before 1961. On the right those standards narrowed the field to one, the Wall Street Journal. The Journal labels itself conservative and is so regarded by competing publications and the conservative and liberal political community. As of this writing, except for the superficial USA Today, it is also the nation’s largest circulation newspaper as well as the leading financial newspaper. The main drawback of the Journal for our purposes is that it tends by its nature to concentrate on financial concerns, but its editorials and articles cover other areas as well, and its reporting has broadened considerably over the years.

Selection of a second conservative newspaper represented a bigger problem. The only one that comes close to fitting our criteria is the Chicago Tribune, but it is not a national publication. A large percentage of the Journal’s readers live in cities other than the one in which it is edited. The same cannot be said of the Tribune. There is simply no other conservative newspaper comparable to the Journal. That realization forced us to turn our attention to journals of opinion, and having done so the automatic choice was National Review. National Review has been consistently conservative, and most regard it as more responsible than any other single publication for shaping contemporary conservatism. Its circulation is not nearly as large as the Tribune’s, but it casts a longer shadow in terms of the impact of its editorial ideas.

In selecting two representatives of liberalism, it occurred to us to stay with one newspaper and one journal of opinion, but we were unable to find a representative of liberalism that would serve as a counterpart to National Review. Two possibilities presented themselves—The New Republic and The Nation. The first did not remain consistently liberal throughout the period under study, and our perception is that The Nation is well to the left of mainstream liberalism. So we returned to two newspapers, and our criteria almost automatically narrowed the field the Washington Post and the New York Times.

Some have quarreled with our characterization of the Post and
Times as liberal. Those on the far left regard them as little different from the Wall Street Journal or National Review. (Those on the far right have a similarly compressed view from the opposite end of the spectrum.) Rarely do the Post or Times label themselves liberal. Each presents itself as a champion of enlightenment, not as the representative of an ideological perspective. However, the national community of moderate liberals, conservatives, and centrists regard both newspapers as liberal. Certainly, the editors of National Review and the Journal view the Post and the Times as liberal just as the Post and the Times regard National Review and the Journal as conservative. Furthermore, Post or Times editorials praising a conservative policy or conservative politician are rarities.

To calibrate the ideological orientations of the Post and Times we compared their editorial positions with the venerable ADA standard. The complete analysis can be found in Permaloff & Grafton (2006). Our work began with a database of editorials generated by a random sample of 1,377 days of the newspapers and 326 issues for the biweekly National Review for the years 1961-1998 for a total of 13,827 editorials. After developing these samples we gained access to searchable electronic data bases that include all of the editorials of these four publications over approximately the last 20-26 years (the time span varies from publication to publication in the database).

We started by compiling all ADA positions not relating to foreign or defense policy. Editorial positions in our samples were related to the ADA positions with the simple coding: agree with ADA; disagree with ADA; or no editorial position equating to an ADA position. We calculated the percentage of a publication’s positions that agreed with the ADA out of the total where there was a publication position. The mean percentages for the years 1962-1998 are: New York Times 97.2 and Washington Post 92.0. Even though no one has questioned the conservative bone fides of the Wall Street Journal and National Review we also calculated their levels of agreement with the ADA which were an unsurprising 6.3 per cent and 2.5 percent, respectively.

Using two publications for each ideological perspective allows us to tap positions even when one publication failed to take one. We examined the relationship between ADA positions and those of either
or both liberal publications and conservative publications. We also tabulated the rare instances of disagreement between the ideologically similar publications (1.2 percent disagreement between the *Times* and *Post* and 1.8 percent disagreement between the *Journal* and *National Review*). The percentage of *Times/Post* positions that agree with the ADA continues to show overwhelming support with a mean of 93.7 per cent. Combining the *Journal* and *National Review* produced a mean support score of 3.5 per cent.

More recently, as a spot check we partially updated our published comparison of the ADA and our four barometer publications, and there are no substantial changes. The percentage of *Times/Post* positions that agree with the ADA was for 1999, 2000, and 2010: 92.3 percent, 89.5 percent, and 100 percent, respectively. For these years 16.3 percent, 20.8 percent, and 10.5 percent of ADA positions had no *Times/Post* editorial counterparts. In 2010 there were two such ADA positions: one was ADA, H14, a September 16, 2010 vote on H.R. 4785, the Rural Energy Savings Program Act which would provide loans for energy efficiency programs in rural areas and the other was ADA, S1, the February 9, 2010 confirmation of Paul Becker to the National Labor Relations Board. The *Times* and *Post* could have favored either side of these votes.

The percentage of *Wall Street Journal* and *National Review* editorials agreeing with the ADA was for 1999, 2000, and 2010: 4.3 percent, 0 percent, and 0 percent, respectively. In 2010 there were two ADA positions without *Journal/National Review* counterparts: ADA, H11 on July 29 the 9/11 Health and Compensation Act intended to provide aid to responders and victims of terrorism; and ADA, H17 on December 15 intended to repeal the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell rule in the military. Depending on specifics, the *Journal* and *National Review* might have taken either side on the first one, and they might have been divided on the second.

If the *Times/Post* were a member of Congress, its ADA rating would exceed 90. By way of comparison, the 2006 ADA scores for Senators Feinstein (D, CA) and Reid (D, NV) were 90. Senators Sessions (R, AL) and Domenici (R, NM) each received ADA ratings

Whether editorials should be used to measure ideology depends on the uses to which they are put. For roll call analysis ADA indices are appropriate, and they are less labor intensive than editorials. But editorials move beyond measurement of the ideological positions of members of Congress and congressional votes (the ADA score focus and that of Poole and Rosenthal). Many areas of public policy are not covered by the small number of congressional votes included in ADA listings or even the universe of congressional votes that Poole and Rosenthal include. Furthermore, editorials present a fuller appreciation of public policy positions taken by both the liberal and conservative sides. Editorials can also highlight areas of disagreement over policy found within the liberal or conservative mainstreams. Equally important, editorials provide a picture of changing ideologies over time. And, the positions taken by the editorials in the four publications we use are tracked by ideologues, politicians, interest group leaders, the politically attentive public, and other media.

**The Janda, Berry, Goldman model**

ADA scores and the editorials of our four barometer publications are useful, but we also need models of liberalism and conservatism that simplify these ideologies so that we can study their public policy implications without losing important detail. Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry Goldman (1992) (JBG) developed a theory of liberalism and conservatism consistent with most histories of each ideological perspective (e.g., Hoover 1987; Dunn & Woodard 1996; Young 1996; White 1964; Schapiro 1958; Eccleshall, Geoghegan, & Wilford 1984; Hamby 1973; Viereck 1949 and 1956; Hartz 1955; Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1984). By their reckoning, a liberal tends to favor equality over freedom and freedom over order; a conservative tends to favor freedom over equality and order over freedom (Janda, Berry, and Goldman 1992, 175). Histories of liberalism and conservatism make clear that freedom, equality, and order were central to both ideologies at their beginnings.
and remain so today. JBG pay no attention to divisions inside liberal and conservative camps. Their model ignores important and widely discussed values such as economic prosperity and justice that also are prominent in the histories of liberalism and conservatism. We deal with these concepts later. Nevertheless, their work may serve as the beginning of a theoretical framework with which to relate ideology and public policy. We start by exploring the component parts of the JBG model.

Generic definitions of freedom, equality, and order obscure as much as they reveal, but they are a place to begin. Freedom is often said to include: political independence; immunity from the arbitrary exercise of authority; exemption from an unpleasant or onerous condition as in freedom from want; and the capacity to exercise choice. Equality typically refers to having the same: privileges; status; and rights. Definitions of order variously include: tidiness; peace and quiet; absence of crime; systematization, regularity, and uniformity; a condition in which one’s person and property are not interfered with except for a sound legal reason and then only by government; adherence to established custom; discipline and obedience; and hierarchy.

The JBG model does not overtly include the concept of justice, although equality might be stretched to include it. Justice is sometimes used to mean that someone gets what he or she deserves, but the word “deserves” may be defined as determined by the market or as decided by various standards of fairness. This extreme flexibility may have caused JBG to exclude justice from their model. In many authors’ hands justice appears to mean whatever they happen to favor.

Aside from justice, the JBG model reflects many of the basic value differences between liberalism and conservatism, and it can be extended to classical liberalism. In our view, classical liberals value freedom above equality and order. The value differences specified by the JBG model connect directly to many public policy differences between liberals and conservatives. Any discussion that begins with a single one of these values quickly encompasses the others, but at this point we must cover them one at a time. We discussed freedom,
equality, and order in the previous chapter, but here we examine them with the idea of using the JBG model to relate liberalism and conservatism to public policy.

**Freedom**

From Locke forward liberal and conservative theorists champion freedom, although they differ somewhat regarding its value in particular circumstances especially when free individuals are economically impoverished. At the system-wide level liberal and conservative theorists and editorial writers agree on essentially the same set of constitutional provisions to protect freedom. One is a somewhat difficult to change constitution. Another is constitutional provisions and associated statutes containing protections of such rights as freedom of religion, speech, and assembly. Democratic elections are also seen by liberals and conservatives as protecting freedom. However, it is widely recognized by both liberal and conservative theorists that elections can threaten freedom as well as protect it. Electoral majorities have voted to restrict freedom, especially the freedom of minorities. Alexis DeTocqueville (1945) referred to this possibility as democratic despotism, and it was experienced first hand by African Americans in the South for well over a century.

Freedom is both desirable in and of itself and an element in the market economy that facilitates the production and distribution of goods and services. We will see that liberals and conservatives agree that the market economy is superior to all other economic systems especially socialist, communist, and fascist command economies. Economic freedom (i.e., the ability to manufacture, distribute, sell, and buy private goods within a framework of property rights) is essential to the functioning of a market economy. Furthermore, liberals and conservatives share the view that severe constraints on economic freedom are likely to be quickly followed by reductions in political freedom.

Alan Ryan (2012, 33-34) appears to disagree with our rendition of liberal attitudes toward capitalism. Indeed, he identifies “anticapitalism” as a central quality of contemporary liberalism. He allows that there is: “an obvious affinity between liberalism... and the
rule of private property and freedom of contract on the other. The liberal view that the individual is, by natural right or by something tantamount to it, sovereign over himself, his talents, and his property is at once the basis of limited government, the rule of law, individual liberty, and a capitalist economy.” (pp. 33-34) But, citing Green and Hobhouse, he describes a lopsided relationship between modern wage laborers and corporations that can only be redressed by devices such as labor unions backed by government authority. We would not describe such a position as anticapitalism.

Both sides agree in general terms that no one can enjoy unlimited freedom. Freedom must be limited to prevent harm to others. The phrase “harm to others” is difficult to define in practice, but both sides favor laws against criminal behavior, libel and slander, and acts that damage innocent parties. These constraints require a rule of law applied equally to all.

We saw in the previous chapter that classical liberals defined and continue to define freedom as negative freedom meaning “no external constraints” especially those emanating from government (Hayek 1960, 11). In practice, of course, no one experiences a complete lack of external constraints. Green, Hobhouse, and others at the turn of the previous century added the notion of positive freedom which includes resources from which choices can be made. Wage laborers barely able to support themselves and their families are by this standard less free than well paid professionals even though both experience identical external constraints. Similarly, Gerald Cohen (2001) maintains that poverty limits a person’s freedom.

In contrast, Friedrich Hayek (1960, 16) defines positive freedom which he calls “liberty as power” as “the ability to satisfy our wishes, or the extent of the choices of alternatives open to us.” For Hayek, liberty as power is not freedom. Hayek and other classical liberals value the ability to satisfy wishes, which is often accomplished through the possession of wealth, but they regard it as different from freedom. Conflating the two merely confuses them and muddies our ability to make useful distinctions between them. The lack of external constraints especially those inflicted by government is not the same as wealth or other ways that we might have to improve our
lives.

Postmodern theorists such as Nancy J. Hirschmann (2003, 10-11) add other elements to positive freedom, that of the social construction of the person exercising choice as well as the choices to be made. Her reasoning is that people and their environments provide menus of what we are allowed to do and “what we are allowed to be [italics in original].” (p. 11) Our freedom is limited almost invisibly beyond whatever external governmental or other constraints might apply. Social construction: “determines what choices are available; customs, laws, and practices make certain options possible and foreclose others. For instance, the United States funding policies have made space travel possible, but illnesses such as diabetes still ravage the lives of millions of children and adults...” (p. 93) In addition, social construction concerns: “the conditions for making choices and to understanding of what counts as choice.” (p. 95)

What are the public policy implications of the postmodern view of freedom? Hirschmann’s point that customs, laws, and practices allow some choices and foreclose others is not new or unique to postmodern theory. This reality has been part of benefit-cost analysis, decision theory, and budgeting for decades in the form of opportunity costs. An opportunity cost is the best alternative use of a resource which might be time, money, or any other value. To use her example, the cost of space travel is the cost of the best alternative use of that funding including research on diabetes, research on heart disease, the construction of an expressway, or a tax cut. It is not obvious what the best alternative is partly because we may not know the chances of success of the research programs. Also, the new expressway may save lives and reduce travel times both of which count as benefits. Nor is her theme that social construction determines what we allowed to be new. Our understanding that a government controlled by, for example, fundamentalist Muslims socializes women to not even consider some career choices or even think about having a career does not require the complex and abstract superstructure of postmodern theory.

*Equality*

The topic of equality is typically approached as meaning equality
before the law, equality of opportunity, and equality in the
distribution of material goods. Vernon Van Dyke (1990, 10) adopts
a standard of equality from Benn and Peters (1959): everyone should
be treated the same unless there is good reason for treating them
differently. This definition is similar to a standard public finance
specification of equitable taxation: equal treatment of equals and
unequal treatment of unequals (Simons 1950). The unequal treatment
of unequals must not be, in Van Dyke’s words, “arbitrary or
capricious.” (1990, 11) Van Dyke adds that unequal treatment of
unequals must serve the public interest even though deciding what is
in the public interest is rarely easy in particular circumstances
(Dworkin 1984, 63).

Liberals and conservatives differ little in favoring equality before
the law although they often disagree regarding implementation, and
those differences are usually predictable using the JBG model
(Dworkin 1984, 62). For example, while liberals and conservatives
agree in principle that those accused of crimes should be treated the
same by the criminal justice system, liberals, with their higher
ranking of equality, have been much more active in insuring that
indigent defendants be given adequate legal counsel.

In his treatment of equality Van Dyke (1995, 85) begins with a
narrow definition of equality of opportunity as: “what exists in the
absence of arbitrary discrimination.” Liberals regard this definition
as just the beginning of the full meaning of equality while
conservatives see it as nearly complete.

The second element of Van Dyke’s definition of equality of
opportunity adds to the first: “the absence of disadvantages or
handicaps for which society is responsible.” (1995, 85) The third
element encompasses the first and second and adds: “disadvantages
or handicaps for which the individual is not responsible, such as birth
in a poor family or with a physical handicap.” (1995, 85) See Arneson
(2015, 213-214) for a similar element-by-element definition of
freedom.

Jan Narveson (1997, 26) describes what he calls a radical
egalitarian position which is a logical extension of Van Dyke’s third
element. An example is an individual who is paid a high salary
based on an elite education which is founded in turn on a high intelligence. The radical egalitarian observes that the superior intelligence is purely a matter of luck. The individual did nothing to earn a high salary or the intelligence that generates it and therefore does not deserve it.

Other theorists see the left as broadening equality beyond legal equality and some measure of equality of material wealth. Todd Lindberg (2013) adds identity. He defines identity as: “something one has in common with others.” (p. 5) Society assigns status based on identity, and Lindberg explains that the left regards the privileged status of some (e.g., white males) as improper. At the same time: “some statuses have been improperly denigrated, for example, gay men in homophobic societies. The Left has long sought to bring down the status of the privileged and elevate the status of the denigrated. This, too, is the pursuit of equality.” (pp. 5-6) Jonathan Wolff (2010) observes that what he calls the current socialist goal: “is not so much to achieve an equal distribution of material goods, but to create a society in which each individual can think of themselves as valued as an equal.” (p. 337) Wolff adds to all this his sense that equality includes the values of fairness and respect, but he admits that these values may be impossible to pursue simultaneously and that they might even conflict in some cases (p. 342).

Liberals see Van Dyke’s second and third elements as perhaps not practically achievable but as worthy objectives, but relatively few liberals concerned with public policy endorse radical egalitarianism if only, we suspect, because defining it much less operationalizing it appears impossible. Conservatives are willing to use government to ameliorate some disadvantages to create a minimal safety net, but little more.

With regard to the distribution of economic resources liberals are not levelers advocating absolute equality, but they regard the market economy as allowing excessively unequal distributions that government is obliged to redistribute using such devices as progressive taxation and government funded health insurance. In contrast, conservatives do not question the fairness of the operations of the market economy. The economic worth of a private
good including an individual’s work is determined by supply and
demand; fairness does not enter into these valuations. Conserving
does not regard the political system as competent to change the impact of market operations on equality or inequality.
However, we saw in the previous chapter that most conservatives are
willing to provide narrowly defined security against severe physical privation.

Conservatives and liberals agree that equality before the law is
critically important, but conservatives are more inclined to see
attempts to enhance equality in the distribution of material goods and
equality of opportunity as violations of equality before the law. Few
liberals take these conservative arguments seriously, but
conservative criticisms that liberal initiatives such as affirmative
action contradict the standard of equality before the law have had
greater traction. Conservatives and liberals have also differed regarding equality before the law in the field of criminal justice.

The liberalism of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and
arguably Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) does not extend
to radical egalitarianism. Nevertheless, both liberal publications and
the ADA consistently push for government programs aimed at achieving greater economic equality, greater equality of opportunity, and
greater equality in criminal defense matters. The *Wall Street
Journal* and *National Review* just as consistently oppose such
programs. Clearly, liberals rank equality more highly than do conservatives.

Ian Adams (2001, 37) observes an incompatibility between
freedom and equality in liberal thought and policy positions. Freedom will result in inequality, but enforcement of economic
equality can only be accomplishment by drastically reducing freedom. Conservative opposition to liberal initiatives meant to
enhance equality often hinge on Adams’ point.

**Order**

We saw in the preceding chapter that the history of conservatism
provides ample evidence for Janda, Berry, and Goldman’s (1992)
observation that conservatives rank order ahead of equality and
freedom. Order of a sort can be imposed by a police state although
the history of dictatorships suggests that they often not only fail to maintain order, they are the most important source of disorder (Arendt 1951). In any event, the order of the Leviathan is not the order that liberals or conservatives favor. Nevertheless, liberals and conservatives recognize that freedom in any meaningful sense is not possible without order. Defining order and balancing order and freedom are not easy in theory or practice (Hobhouse 1911; Kirk 1998, 182).

Liberals and conservatives often disagree over what constitutes order. For conservative Russell Kirk (1998) the central difference is between conservatives “who believe in a transcendent moral order” and liberals (and classical liberals) for whom material existence is all important (p. 182). Kirk’s vision of order is Edmund Burke’s: “society is a community of souls, joining the dead, the living, and those yet unborn...” (p. 183) To a great degree, the conservative sense of order is traditional order. For conservatives the fact that an institution (e.g., church or family) or way of doing things (e.g., prayer in schools or federalism) is old is evidence that it should be maintained (Dworkin 1984, 72). For liberals institutional longevity or traditions mean little or nothing.

Conservatives perceive liberals as too often willing to sacrifice order for freedom. For example, to many conservatives the legalization of abortion and the banning of prayer in public schools violate traditional order. To liberals pre-

Documenting JBG

In another study (Permaloff & Grafton 2003) we examined the validity of the JBG model by comparing it to the characterizations of liberalism and conservatism in all refereed social science, humanities, and history journal articles in a large computerized index (EBSCO Host-Academic Search Elite) in the ten year period 1992-2001. The details of our research design and statistical analysis are available in that study.
We used a simple rating system to determine what values (equality, freedom, and order), if any, an author imputed to liberalism and conservatism. Biases of the authors for or against liberalism or conservatism and methodologies were not considered. Our only concern was the attention given to equality, freedom, and order in characterizations of liberalism and conservatism.

Our study concluded that these articles characterized liberals as valuing equality, freedom, and order. Their authors devoted more attention to equality than freedom (to a statistically significant degree) and more attention to freedom than order (to a statistically significant degree). Conservatives were portrayed as paying less attention to equality than freedom or order (to a statistically significant degree) and as sometimes opposed to government programs designed to increase equality. There was no statistically significant difference in the attention conservatives paid to freedom and order.

In addition, values other than equality, freedom, and order that appeared in the journal articles were listed and a count maintained. For the most part, these values were subcategories of equality, freedom, or order or they were eccentric to one author (e.g., ethnocentrism as a liberal value), or they were shared by liberals and conservatives.

The JBG model is parsimonious and fairly comprehensive even though, as we noted above, it ignores intra ideological conflict and philosophical disagreements. Just as importantly, neither the JBG model nor most of the journal articles we analyzed made significant connections between liberal and conservative preferences among equality, freedom, and order and public policy except for passing examples. Only a handful of articles devoted to a single policy area such as housing for the poor connected ideological values and public policy in any systematic fashion.

**Business and economics**

Perhaps the largest gap in the JBG model is that it says little about public policy for business and economics. The high liberal ranking of equality hints at elements of liberal public policy for business and economics such as advocacy of the progressive income tax, but
overall the connection is far from obvious. Our answer to this problem is to add a model based on the concept of market failure (Grafton & Permaloff 2001; others; Conover & Feldman 1981).

The market economy and market failure

The market economy (a.k.a. free market economy) is an academic model or ideal type that has its origins in Adam Smith’s 1776 study An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, generally referred to as The Wealth of Nations. A market economy features the free production and trading of private goods and services with minimal government involvement and is in part made up of a number of assumptions such as:

- **The existence of markets.** A market is a physical or virtual location where goods and services are exchanged or bought and sold.

- **Many manufacturers.** In each sector of the economy (e.g., automobiles or housing) there are a great many manufacturers or providers of services. There are so many manufacturers or providers of services that no single one can significantly affect the price of goods or services or the quantities produced.

- **Many buyers.** In each sector of the economy there are so many buyers that no single one can significantly affect the price of goods or services or the quantities produced.

- **Property rights.** Property is owned and can be bought and sold by individuals (people or legal entities such as corporations). Government’s authority to appropriate property is severely limited and restricted by legal procedures.

- **Supply and demand.** Prices and quantities of goods produced or services offered are established automatically by the market by a balancing of supply and demand. This process is never static, but when it is disrupted by an especially powerful change, it reestablishes the balance or finds a new one.

- **Perfect knowledge or transparency.** Buyers and sellers possess all the information they need to make decisions. The market model assumes that buyers and sellers have the level of knowledge available to a chess player (the rank and locations of all pieces are known to both players) as opposed to the
knowledge available to a poker player (some or all cards are hidden) (O’Driscoll 1977, 13-24).

• **Laissez faire.** Government’s involvement in the economy is minimal. Government’s role is restricted to national defense, maintaining order including protection of property rights, coining money, and other basic functions.

• **Free movement of factors of production.** Labor, capital, physical resources, entrepreneurial talent, and ownership of land may move anywhere including across borders.

In a market economy people are not obliged to do everything themselves. Instead, they can efficiently specialize on what they do best, trading excess output with others who specialize in producing something else. Prices established in the market signal the worth of land, labor, capital, raw materials, and finished products thus coordinating decision-making (Shipman 1999, 38). Frederich Hayek (1948, 87) provided the example of scarcity in a raw material. Diminished supply results in a higher price. Everyone who uses that material quickly finds ways to consume less of it or use it more efficiently. In the longer run those who produce the raw material (e.g., oil drillers and refiners) are motivated by its higher price to find more of it, discover more efficient ways to produce it, or invent substitute materials. These economically correct results occur with no government involvement.

Liberal and conservative economists (with no exceptions that we can locate) argue that market economies perform better than any other system (Shipman 1999, 13). The list of assumptions that makes up the core of the market model suggests that the market economy by itself cannot do everything. The ways that the market delivers unsatisfactory results is usually called the theory of market failure (Wolf 1979, 116-117).

Perhaps the most important source of failure is that market economies usually cannot supply public goods at levels that society as a whole wants. The easiest way to define the term public good is first to define private good. By definition the purchaser of a private good such as a pencil or a house controls its use (Musgrave 2006, 24). The theory of market failure asserts that the market’s
production and distribution of *private* goods cannot be improved by any other social mechanism such as government.

By definition a public good can be used by anyone no matter who contributes to its purchase. National defense is a common example. Everyone benefits from national defense including those who contribute nothing toward its support. It is impossible to imagine a market economy by itself providing national defense at adequate levels. Only government with its authority to tax can raise the funding needed to supply the necessary personnel and material. Other examples of public goods include basic research, police and fire protection, street and highway construction and maintenance, and public education. The reader might object that several of these examples are provided as private goods as well as public goods. For example, police and fire protection are purchased in the form of guards for industrial facilities and volunteer fire departments in rural areas. Nevertheless, city-wide police and fire protection would not be made available at optimum levels by the market alone if only because some low income areas would go unprotected (Wolf 1979, 116).

The market also cannot contend with problems stemming from negative externalities. A negative externality is a cost inflicted on individuals or groups without their permission. The most common example is air or water pollution. Without laws against pollution, industries, farms, or individuals can expel pollutants at no cost to themselves leaving it up to those surrounding them to pay in the form of reduced quality of life and ill health. The market economy has no way to force polluters to compensate the victims of pollution. Only government authority can control negative externalities.

Yet another form of market failure can stem from a violation of the assumption in the market model that businesses in a given economic sector are competitive. A few, such as electrical power production, can become monopolistic due to the costly technologies they employ. Because they control their sectors of the market, monopolies are not subjected to the rigorous discipline of a competitive market. A monopoly tends to charge more for its product or service than would be the case in a competitive situation, and the
quality of that product or service will probably be lower than it would be in a competitive environment—monopolies tend to overcharge and under deliver. If a monopoly exists, government authority may be required to force it not to charge excessive amounts for its product or service. Or if a development such as a merger threatens to create a monopoly, government may be obliged to prevent the merger.

Another source of market failure stems from imperfect knowledge also known as knowledge asymmetry. Prospective buyers may not know enough about a product to make a rational purchase. One example is prescription pharmaceuticals. Before the advent of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration the marketplace was awash with ineffective or even toxic medical concoctions. Few individuals are able to evaluate such products on their own, and government must block their sale.

Up to this point the theory of market failure is relatively uncontroversial ideologically. Liberals and conservatives sometimes disagree about the specifics of a particular case such as, for example, whether a particular company constitutes a monopoly requiring government control, but there is a rough consensus on the basic elements of market failure covered so far. However, the next point is ideologically controversial.

We saw in our description of the JBG model that liberals believe that the market if allowed to operate freely will generate grossly unequal distributions of wealth—the rich get richer and the poor poorer. Ronald Dworkin (1984, 67) muses that it seems inconsistent for liberals to endorse an economic system that produces these results. The only alternative, however, is a command economy in which decisions regarding investments, production, wages, and the rest would be made by a central government. But, Dworkin asks, by what principles would liberals operate such a system? Assuming that free market operations are efficient (if unfair), they might try to emulate the market but modify decisions in the direction of greater equality. However, this would require invasions of privacy as officials gather and process data regarding all manner of economic behavior and personal taste. Making matters even worse, officials would begin substituting their own
values for those of the public.

Dworkin (p. 68) also shows that to the degree the controllers of the command economy deviated from market results, they would be violating liberal standards of equality. For example, if the government decided to price a good below its market value, consumers of that good are receiving more than their fair share of economic output compared to those who prefer a different use of economic resources. In addition to these problems, the changed allocations would reduce the efficiency of the economy and the total productivity of the economy thereby redistributing a shrinking pie.

Rather than inserting themselves into the operations of the market, liberals prefer to siphon its output using progressive taxation and then funding redistributive programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Security. The former redistributes from middle and upper income earners to low income earners; the latter redistributes across generations (young to old). In the liberal view government intervention to partially equalize the distribution of wealth is necessary. Some conservatives argue that unequal distributions of wealth are fair because people are paid what they are worth while other conservatives regard the question of fairness in this context inapplicable. Either way, conservatives regard government intervention as inefficient and unnecessary except to provide a safety net.

The theory of market failure explains why government does much of what it does. A large part of the federal budget or any state, county, or city budget is devoted to providing public goods, and a substantial part of the legal code is meant directly or indirectly to correct other instances of market failure. The theory of non-market (government) failure

The market’s inability to produce and distribute public goods, process negative externalities, defend consumers against monopolies, protect consumers from dangerous products, and, arguably, maintain a fair distribution of wealth means that government must act. However, government has its own deficiencies. Thus, Charles Wolf, Jr. (1979) proposes a counterpart to the theory of market failure called the theory of non-market (government) failure.
One reason for government failure is that government outputs are sometimes difficult to define and measure (Wolf 1979, 118). As an example, Wolf points to pollution regulations and cleanup efforts intended to improve the often difficult to measure public health. Sickness can be caused by many factors, not just pollution. Also, there is frequently a lengthy time lag between environmental changes and improvements in health which makes establishing a causal relationship between pollution reduction and health improvements a challenging research question. Another example is national defense intended among other things to intimidate potential enemies. The effectiveness of the military as a deterrent is not tested until it fails.

Private sector outputs are sold on the market, and the success or failure of an offering is immediately apparent. Success is quickly rewarded and failure punished. Immediate feedback is often lacking with government outputs (Wolf 1979, 119). Debates over the quality of public schools illustrate this point. School quality is not easy to measure, and political self-interest muddies evaluation studies. Making matters worse, government programs are frequently monopolies with the same faults as their private monopoly counterparts. Again, public schools serve as an example. Often the only immediate alternative available to parents dissatisfied with the quality of public schools is an expensive private school or another costly option of moving to another school district. Neither choice is open to the poor.

The common absence of a bottom line in government programs sometimes means that government agencies develop internal objectives that have little or no relationship to the goals the programs are meant to serve. One common internal goal is budget growth for its own sake and another is the use of information to enhance personal or organizational status and agency policy (Wildavsky & Caiden 2004; Bardach 1977; Wolf 1979, 125).

Wolf (1979, 127-28) labels another type of non-market failure derived externalities. This term refers to unanticipated consequences of government programs. Such side effects are caused by government programs being large blunt instruments affecting complex societal or
economic problems. For example, federal subsidies of ethanol distilled from corn have probably increased the price of corn by increasing the demand for corn; they have also increased prices of other commodities by reducing supply as farmers shift production from those commodities to corn.

Government programs can also produce distributional inequities. Instead of the rich getting richer as they can in a market economy, the politically powerful get richer as they receive disproportionate shares of government largesse. In the case of agricultural subsidies large politically astute agribusiness operations can gain at the expense of average taxpayers. Wolf (1979, 129-130) cites other examples such as government contracts granted to companies who support winning congressional candidates. Distributional inequities can also stem from members of Congress or a president promoting and receiving political credit for expensive or unworkable new programs whose cost and operational faults are not apparent until years after they begin.

Liberals and conservatives

It is conventional wisdom that liberals are more sensitive to market failure than conservatives and that conservatives are more sensitive to government or non-market failure than liberals. These tendencies are reflected in their attitudes toward federal government power over business and the economy. The federal government exercises power over business and the economy primarily via regulations (broadly defined), fines, and taxes. The conventional view is that liberals tend to favor increased federal government power over business and the economy, and that conservatives favor less. An analysis of editorials of our four barometer publications in the years 1961-1998 confirms this view. The percentages of combined Times/Post and Wall Street Journal/National Review editorials that favored increasing federal power over business as a percentage of the number of editorials that took a position on increasing or decreasing federal power over business are starkly different (Grafton & Permaloff 2001, 416). The differences are stark. Even in 1981 when the liberal and conservative positions were at their closest, more than 25 percentage points separated them.
Our research (Grafton & Permaloff 2001) has liberals and conservatives accepting the market economy as providing higher production and fairer distribution of private goods than any other economic system. The central difference between them is their responses to economic problems. Conservatives believe that the market sometimes, for want of a better term, misbehaves and produces results that generate widespread unhappiness, but that given time the market will correct itself. For example, the price of gasoline increases after an oil refinery fire, but when the refinery is rebuilt, gasoline prices will return to pre-fire levels. In this example the market performs correctly. The gasoline price increase reflects its greater scarcity after the fire, and that increase motivates drivers to slow down and take fewer trips. The market misbehaves only in the sense that there is general unhappiness with its operation.

The Johnson administration pursued an inflationary guns and butter fiscal policy (partly to fund the Vietnam War and increased welfare programs) that produced inflation. A market economy in working order could not have done anything else, but this result was widely viewed as unacceptable. When market misbehavior occurs, liberals often push for federal government intervention to fix the problem as they did in this instance. Liberals advocated the imposition of wage and price controls even though New York Times and Washington Post editorials recognized that this initiative would be ineffective or even harmful. Conservatives saw inflation as the product of overspending, and counseled budget cuts and allowing the market to self-correct. We will see that the general pattern is for liberals to mistake market misbehavior for market failure (we use the term market breakdown) and promote a government response. Later, when it becomes apparent that the market is operating as it should, liberals tend to retract their support for intervention.

Market breakdown refers to a situation in which the market cannot operate. We prefer the word “breakdown” to “failure” because the phrase market failure is defined in too many ways to be useful for our purposes. Earlier in this chapter we used air and water pollution as examples of negative externalities that the market cannot process. Only government authority can ameliorate pollution damage. Faced with market breakdown liberals are quick to propose
initiatives such as the creation of a new regulatory system (the Environmental Protection Agency and associated state government bodies) in the case of pollution. At first, liberals usually treat market misbehavior and breakdown identically because liberals do not distinguish between them. The difference is that liberals learn—sometimes quickly and sometimes slowly—that market misbehavior is temporary and that their attempted solutions are of little consequence. Conservative criticisms of liberal initiatives to correct misbehavior sometimes help liberals see the error of their ways. Similarly, conservatives treat both market misbehavior and breakdown identically. Conservative resistance to liberal initiatives aimed at correcting breakdown ultimately end in conservative surrender and at least partial acceptance of corrective initiatives. Conservatives often critique an initiative’s implementation and may help to improve it. In the case of pollution, we will see in a later section of this study that conservatives, while recognizing that some forms of pollution were destructive, resisted and later accepted liberal environmental initiatives. The theory of human caused global warming represents an exception to this pattern. Many conservatives do not regard greenhouse gases such as CO₂ as pollution. They argue that the data purporting to show the existence of global warming is noisy, the models that supposedly document the finding that warming is caused by humans are problematic with poor predictive accuracy, the conclusion that warming (if it exists) is harmful fails to quantify the cost of the damage (or benefits), and the policies that supposedly would reduce warming are not documented with cost or benefit figures.

Our quantitative comparison of the Times/Post and the Journal/National Review (Grafton & Permaloff 2001) suggests that liberalism and conservatism share few, if any, common opinions regarding the application of federal power to business and the economy. However, behind the apparent chasm between the two sides there are nuances and change not widely appreciated. These aspects only become apparent when one examines ideological positions over a number of years as opposed to comparing ideological views at a discrete point in time.

Liberals and conservatives share the same intellectual foundation
from which they view business and economics. This body of ideas extends back centuries to the work of John Locke and Adam Smith. Liberal and conservative moral/value theories relative to business and economics are very similar: those policies are best that result in high levels of production and widespread distribution of goods and services (New York Times State of the economy, 3/7/1961; The economy moves up, 8/17/1961; Sadoun 2007, 77). As previous chapters and sections above suggest, liberals are more sensitive to market failure (misbehavior or breakdown) and more inclined to favor federal initiatives to correct it. Thus, for example, liberals and conservatives both favor high levels of manufacturing, but liberals are more likely to attack problems associated with industrial pollution, dangerous work environments, consumer protection, and antitrust.

Liberal and conservative business and economics policy theories are also similar. Both believe that the market economy results in higher production of and fairer distribution of private goods than any other economic system especially the centralized planning approaches attempted by Marxist and socialist countries. Command economies are the subject of decades of withering criticism from all four of our barometer publications. This treatment abated when the failure of command economies became self-evident and required no further comment. China’s apparent success using what might be described as a hybrid command-market economy combined with a dictatorship has attracted admiring commentary from some investors, but recently that country’s opaque accounting rules, inclination to favor government run companies over foreign competitors, lack of a rule of law, and problems with large government enterprises are generating a new wave of critiques of central planning.

Liberals and conservatives believe that anything that interferes with free international trade such as tariffs hurts everyone in the long run (with qualifications by liberals regarding what they view as unfair international competition and exploitive labor practices) (NYT Ending the gold rush, 2/7/1961). They also believe that the market is the best arbiter of the use of technology in the workplace (again with some qualifications by liberals) (NYT What price progress in the fields? 10/3/1997; The jobless tide recedes, 3/9/1962). For example, all four
barometer publications were hostile to union work stoppages protesting the introduction of automation (*WP* Technology and “unwork,” 8/29/1962; Rail truce by mandate, 8/23/1963). There also was a consensus that labor-management power should be balanced so that each side can do roughly equal damage to the other (*WP* The striker replacement issue, 3/13/1995; A ruling on striker replacement, 5/15/1996; Galbraith 1952).

Finally, they believe that business subsidies increase taxes unnecessarily, distort markets, and hurt the public interest in the long run (*NR* Don’t count your Chryslers, 5/27/1983). In the 1960s and part of the 1970s liberals favored farm price supports, a form of business subsidy, but most liberals slowly came to realize that these payments were unjustifiable (*NYT* Revolt on the farms, 8/31/1962; Wooing the farm bloc, 3/3/1964; Federal water versus reason, 9/26/1979; Dairy farmer diets are a bit rich, 6/23/1980). We will see in a later chapter that liberals also are questioning the wisdom of corn-based ethanol subsidies.

Liberal and conservative responses to market misbehavior and breakdown represent a kind of partnership in which debates over the nature of a problem may improve the ultimate governmental response, although resources are wasted when liberals concoct sometimes expensive solutions to market misbehavior non-problems and damage is done when conservatives block liberal solutions to real problems.

This variant of the theory of market failure explains much of the disagreement between liberals and conservatives in areas of public policy dealing with business and economics. The JBG model does the same in areas of domestic public policy that do not concern business and economics.

**Initiatives that Span the JBG Model and Our Modified Market Failure Model**

A majority of the initiatives that we examine in this study can be categorized with little ambiguity as concerning business and economics or other domestic public policy (non-business and economics). For example, freedom of speech, privacy, voting rights, and prayer in public schools fall clearly into the non-business and
economics category, and they can be understood in terms of the equality, freedom, and order hierarchies of the JBG model. Similarly, antitrust, transportation regulation, and pollution fall almost entirely in the realm of economics and business. Public policy for the environment has a small JBG element called environmental justice (arising especially in the Super Fund and Brownfields initiatives), but pollution can be fully understood as a form of market breakdown causing widespread damage and requiring the application of government authority. Equality, freedom, and order barely come into play except when some remedies disproportionately affect the poor or minorities. We rely on initiative advocates, opponents, and our barometer publications to categorize initiatives as concerning business and economics or not.

There are a few initiatives to which both the JBG model and our modified market failure model apply; an initiative’s sponsors and/or its opponents think about the initiative using both models. In this situation several questions arise. Is one model dominant or do sponsors and opponents think about the initiative in terms of both or either? And when both models apply to an initiative do liberals tend to emphasize one and conservatives the other? For example, we might expect liberals to emphasize JBG values (especially equality) and conservatives to emphasize market economics. When the two sides think about an initiative in these two ways, they may talk past each other. This plausible scenario is similar to the much discussed phenomenon of ideological polarization.

**Fawcett’s Four Loose Liberal Ideas**

The conceptions of liberalism and conservatism that we present, with their emphasis on equality, freedom, order, and the market economy, are relatively standard. Edmund Fawcett (2014) offers a somewhat different approach which is consistent with ours. He sees liberalism as “guided by four loose ideas which he lists as ‘conflict, resistance to power, progress, and respect.’” (p. 10) He came by these characteristics by observing politicians and theorists who identify with liberalism.

By conflict Fawcett means the liberal view that struggles among interests and beliefs are inevitable and potentially productive (pp. 14-
15). This perspective is consistent with the liberal (and conservative) requirement that freedom of speech and democracy are necessary elements of a good society.

Shifting to resistance to power, according to Fawcett, liberals regard power of some people over others as leading to arbitrary domination unless resisted. Liberals (and we would add conservatives) resist “domination by any single interest, faith, or class.” (p. 11) What we have been discussing as equality before the law and freedom are essential to this resistance to power.

Regarding a belief in progress, Fawcett is correct that liberals have a sunny attitude toward societal change. As we saw earlier, conservatives have a less optimistic view of human character and the potential for its improvement (also Fawcett 2014, 12).

Respect refers to the liberal belief that there are moral limits as to how those with superior power should treat others. For liberals superior power should not “obstruct or intrude on people in pursuit of their chosen enterprises or beliefs.” (p. 11)

**Ideological Change and its Impact on Public Policy**

Many different literatures might be expected to shed light on ideological change and public policy formulation. These literatures include problem definition, agenda setting, policy formulation, and conflict theory including Marxism, discourse theory, and frame theory. They deal with areas of public policy that prominently feature ideology, but they are surprisingly unhelpful.

**Problem definition, agenda setting, and policy formulation**

The extensive literatures on government problem definition, agenda setting, and policy formulation pay little attention to ideology even though the policy areas with which they deal are often highly animated ideologically (Dearing & Rogers 1996; Rochefort & Cobb 1994). Prominent authors in these fields often use such examples as prayer in schools, abortion, affirmative action, and energy policy, but their treatments of ideology tend to be superficial with casual references to liberals, conservatives, or other persuasions and little more. Paul Sabatier’s (1991) advocacy coalition approach includes “belief systems” that might
be mistaken for ideology, but his belief systems are much closer to David Truman’s (1960) interests with his greater emphasis on self-interest than ideology.

**Conflict theory**

Marxian theory asserts the inevitability of conflict between capitalists, workers, and the bourgeoisie. Ralf Dahrendorf (1959, 290-293) offers a version of conflict theory more sophisticated than Marx’s that centers on conflict between dominant and subjugated groups. Similarly, John B. Thompson (1990, 7) describes ideology as a device to establish and maintain power relationships that are “systematically asymmetrical,” that is, “relations of domination.” Thus, conflict theories view conflict as normal and as pitting the powerful against the relatively powerless. We make no such assumption, but the likelihood of ideological politics including conflict is manifest. More importantly, we do not assume that political conflict is structured around polarized dominant and subjugated groups. It is easy to imagine that this pattern sometimes obtains, but, again, we see no reason to assume its presence. Similarly, Teun A. Van Dijk (1998) rejects the notion that a definition of ideology should be limited so that ideology is viewed necessarily as an instrument of domination. There are, he notes: “good theoretical and empirical reasons to assume that there are also ideologies of opposition or resistance, or ideologies of competition between equally powerful groups...” (p. 11)

**Discourse theory and frame theory**

Discourse theory and frame theory also fail to address the issues of concern in our research. According to Rosemary Nossiff (1998), discourse and frame theory seek to explain how triggering events can lead to the definition or redefinition of issues in particular ways and the use of discourse by interest groups to frame issues and specify desirable policies and get their issues and solutions onto the societal and governmental agenda (see also Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Despite Nossiff’s assertion that discourse and frame theory attempt to explain the relationship between triggering events and agenda setting, we have found no discourse and frame theory work that does so beyond the bounds of specific case studies nor does
there appear to be a location in these theories for the relationship between triggering events and agenda setting. Furthermore, we see little attempt to identify patterns of triggering events or types of triggering events that lead to particular types of discourse or frames. Even Van Dijk’s (1998) thoughtful work overtly using discourse theory to understand ideology leads after more than 300 pages to few meaningful conclusions.

Discourse and frame studies appear to focus on particular cases rather than the broad, long lived frames of liberalism and conservatism. Many of these case studies present imaginative and perceptive accounts of conflict or consensus between liberals and conservatives, but the quality of these studies owes more to the intelligence of the authors than the power of the analytical tools they wield. Frame and discourse theories tend to present framing and discourse as tools for or elements of ideological or interest group struggle, but the broader ideological conflict tends to go unexamined (e.g., Jacoby 2000; Bergeron 2001; Alba 2000; Coles 2002). Framing is an important and widely discussed tactic in virtually all political struggles, but it does not capture the impact of ideology (Freeden 2003, 105-106).

Effective and Ineffective Ideological Initiatives

The Appendix lists all of the non routine policy initiatives that were the subject of hearings in House of Representatives committees in the years 1961-2009 and some additional initiatives that are not part of the database from which most of the Appendix was drawn.

Among other things, we are examining the effectiveness of initiatives. Effectiveness is defined as the degree to which initiative objectives are achieved primarily as perceived by initiative sponsors. Self-interested actors frequently judge effectiveness differently than ideologues just as liberals and conservatives often judge effectiveness differently from each other. For a self-interested group effectiveness means little more than whether an initiative benefits the group. For ideologues effectiveness is more. Sincere ideologues—ideologues who are not interest group stalking horses—believe that their prescriptions benefit the public interest. Ordinarily, initiative sponsors are some mixture of self-interested groups and ideologues,
and they mostly agree on initiative objectives and whether the initiative is being implemented to achieve those objectives.

We are trying objectively to determine whether initiatives are effective. The first step in doing so is to ask initiative sponsors whether an initiative meets their objectives. Since we cannot interview them, we rely on our barometer publications and interest group publications such as web sites. So, for example, with the Voting Rights Act New York Times and Washington Post editorials and organizations such as the NAACP regarded this law and the ways it was implemented as effective, with some qualifications concerning constraints on voting (e.g., photo ID requirements and limits on when voting can occur) and redistricting.

As we will see below and in later chapters liberals do not always assess initiative effectiveness in a manner that is consistent with liberal objectives especially over a span of years. For example, liberals might regard an initiative as effective soon after it is implemented, but as its long term impact is felt and as its implementation changes, they may come to regard it as ineffective. For this reason we must also examine conservative attitudes concerning the effectiveness of liberal initiatives (and vice versa in the case of the small number of conservative initiatives). What questions would we ask of conservatives? One is whether, according to conservatives, liberals regard liberal initiatives as effective. Conservatives may not find that an initiative achieves liberal objectives, and this may even be the basis for a conservative critique of the initiative. This pattern has arisen with such liberal initiatives as: virtually automatic support for increased regular public school spending; support for agribusiness subsidies; support for the regulation of transportation; virtually automatic support for increased welfare spending; support for antitrust; enacting and expanding health insurance (spanning Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act); initiating and supporting urban renewal; increasing the minimum wage; and enacting affirmative action. For example, liberals regard the minimum wage as benefitting those near the bottom of the economic scale by providing them with higher wages than they would earn in the open marketplace. By and large, liberals regard the minimum wage as achieving this objective.
However, conservatives argue that the minimum wage not only fails to help low wage workers, it hurts them especially when it is increased. Conservatives believe that if the minimum wage is increased enough to force the wages of some workers higher, a number of businesses will respond by not hiring new workers or even dismissing existing ones as well as replacing some with machines. The result is decreased employment for those near the bottom of the economic ladder, not something that liberals want.

Mark Bovens and Paul ‘tHart (1996) devote considerable thought to the question of policy effectiveness in their study of what they call policy fiascoes. An ineffective policy might be thought of as not achieving interest group or ideological objectives, but not necessarily causing damage. A fiasco not only fails to achieve objectives but is destructive if only in the sense that it wastes economic resources.

The reader might believe that any policy so dramatically bad as to be labeled a fiasco would be easy to identify, but Bovens and ‘tHart (1996, 4-6) demonstrate that this is not necessarily true. They describe the case (taken from Feldman 1985) of airport construction near London and Paris. In both countries government committees determined that an additional large airport would be needed for each city to meet what was seen as rapidly increasing air traffic demand.

In England the plan was to expand a military airfield. After decades of studies and public meetings which included protests against the idea, the airfield was opened for public use but only on a small scale. At that time the London project was widely regarded as a failure. Considerable time and money had produced a result which was decidedly not the international airport that had been originally envisioned. In France the large new Charles de Gaulle Airport was planned and built very quickly and was widely seen as a success. However, the passage of time produced different conclusions in both cases. In England air traffic did not increase to the levels forecast when the project started and expansions of the existing Heathrow and Gatwick airports plus improved baggage-handling meant that air traffic could be accommodated without a large new airport. On the other hand, in France the costly
new airport construction meant that an entire town was obliterated and severe noise pollution visited on nearby villages.

These examples not only demonstrate the importance of viewing initiatives and their effectiveness over time, they show that the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an initiative depends on how an objective is defined. If the objective was to build a large, new international airport, the series of events in England would be a failure and in France a success. But, if the objective was to meet the nation’s air traffic needs with minimal disruption and cost, the conclusion would be reversed.

Bovens and ‘tHart devote all of their attention to policy fiascoes, but our concern is both successful and unsuccessful programs. Despite their accentuation of the negative, we should be able to use their penetrating study to build a more comprehensive framework.

As they formulate a definition of the word fiasco, Bovens and ‘tHart (1996, 10-14) explore a number of questions. The first is, “How bad is bad?” They ask how serious the damage is that individuals or groups have experienced from a fiasco. The damage can be physical, psychological, ecological, and whatever other categories people regard as destructive. It seems easier to ask “How bad is bad?” than “How good is good?” Destruction often can be more clearly pinpointed than success. One kind of success that may be easy to discern is an initiative that rescues individuals or groups from a bad situation (e.g., the 1965 Voting Rights Act giving people the right to vote or charter schools delivering students from violent and academically hopeless regular public schools). An initiative that prevents a likely bad situation would also be relatively easy to identify.

Answering the question “How bad is bad?” nearly always depends on values. For example, liberals and some religious adherents believe that a classroom prayer in a public school, a practice ended by Engel v. Vitale (1962), is an infringement of basic rights of privacy as well as a violation of separation of church and state. Most conservatives and many religious adherents regard such a prayer as appropriate in and of itself and a way of instilling tradition and order. Accordingly, liberals and some religious adherents find Engel to be
constructive, while conservatives and other religious adherents regard it as destructive.

Once it has been established that at least someone regards a policy as damaging, Bovens and ‘t Hart turn to a second question. This one asks who or what is to blame for a fiasco? We would ask, who or what is to be blamed or credited for an initiative. Often this determination can be made without difficulty. In the school prayer issue both sides eagerly claimed credit for the stands they took and discussed the decision as a win or loss. A third question concerns the motivation of those who cause a fiasco, a point that also can be broadened to encompass the behavior of those responsible for a successful initiative.

Bovens and ‘t Hart (1996, 15) end up defining a policy fiasco as: “a negative event that is perceived to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymakers.” They add that their definition emphasizes that how fiascoes are viewed is largely a function of values and politics. In our exploration of a wider range of policy failures (not just fiascoes), we would qualify the Bovens and ‘t Hart definition with language that signifies that a policy failure is viewed by some, but not necessarily all, as a negative event. We could adopt the rest of their definition without amendment except that our definition of a policy success would be similar with the substitution of words such as positive for negative and praiseworthy successes for blameworthy failures.

The example of British and French airport construction demonstrates that time is an important factor in evaluating the success or failure of a policy. We will see in a later chapter that public housing and urban renewal programs were widely viewed as effective at least by liberals from the late 1930s to the mid 1950s. By the late 1960s liberals were joining conservatives in excoriating urban renewal and were searching for new methods to provide affordable housing.

Policy evaluation also has a spatial dimension. For example, a national government’s decision to build a large airport will presumably be based on the requirements of the air transport system as a whole, but the decision may have a substantial negative local
component such as the displacement of residents near the airport and the reduction in value of remaining properties surrounding the airport due to air and noise pollution.

Often, unintended consequences further complicate policy evaluation. For example, the Obama administration’s Cash for Clunkers program that paid owners of low mileage automobiles to get rid of them and required that the discarded vehicles’ engines be destroyed, caused a substantial increase in used car prices by removing functioning cars from the marketplace. Presumably, the liberal Democratic sponsors of this initiative did not want their less affluent constituents priced out of the used car market.

The relativity and controversy introduced by unintended consequences, time, space, ideology, and interest group affiliation can perhaps be short circuited by evaluating an initiative exclusively according to the goals set by its sponsors (Bovens and ‘tHart 1998, 39). This is a necessary but insufficient step because there are many standards that might apply including those of initiative opponents. In addition, initiative goals are often vague, and even when the goals are precise, sponsors sometimes are not above changing them. Furthermore, official goals may be set unrealistically low. Making matters even more complicated, initiative sponsors may pursue multiple and not always consistent goals (Bovens and ‘tHart 1998, 41).

Bovens and ‘tHart discuss the complications introduced by large government bureaucracies in charge of program implementation. We add that the programs themselves may vary widely in complexity. Bovens’ and ‘tHart’s central point regarding government agencies is that it is difficult to determine who is responsible for fiascoes. We are not interested in determining personal responsibility. Our focus is organizational behavior and in particular how differently structured organizations implement initiatives of various types. Our concern is how choices regarding initiative characteristics and implementing agencies affect initiative success or failure.

**Ideological core values and self-interest**

The idea of relatively stable ideological core values and less central, more changeable public policy positions has been part of the
study of ideology, political psychology, public opinion, and related specialties for a long time (Converse 1964; Stone 1974, 72-79; and many others). This distinction also arises in studies of individual ideologies (e.g., Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, and Sulloway 2003). James A. McCann (1997, 565) defines an individual’s core political values as: “overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship, and...society.” In a functioning ideology core values are the bases for positions on specific policies (McCann 1997, 565; Feldman 1988, 417).

Because core values must sometimes be balanced against one another, an ideological core is more than a list of values; it is the relationships among those values (Feldman 1988, 420; Jacoby 2006). The JBG model and our modified market failure model are structured in this manner. There must also be logical consistency between core values and specific public policies (Converse 1964, 207-211). Nevertheless, ideological adherents often disagree with one another regarding which specific policies best serve core values. This fact suggests that an ideology’s policy positions are more fluid than its core values. In addition, changing circumstances sometimes produce an alteration in an ideology’s policy positions without core values being touched (McCann 1997, 567). Indeed, a change in policy position may protect core values.

As we noted above, interest groups experience little of the internal conflict exhibited by ideologies. The self-interest core of an interest group is made up of a small package of highly consistent values, and there are fewer disputes among interest group members regarding desirable policies aside from disagreements regarding lobbying tactics and other operational details.

Splits between ideologues and their usual interest group allies sometimes occur when an ideologically-based policy position changes. Ideologue-interest group disagreement between usual allies suggests that something is amiss with either the original initiative or the new ideological position. Inconsistencies of this sort are not common, but when they arise they give observers an opportunity to view the internal dynamics of interest groups, the thought processes of ideologues, or both.
Thoughtfulness, policy theory, and value theory

Thoughtful public policy requires theory. As we noted earlier, we distinguish between policy theory and value theory (Fischer 1995, 18). A value theory justifies a policy as morally right/wrong or constructive/destructive. A policy theory is a generalization regarding how a policy will move us from the present situation to an improved future (King, Keohane, & Verba 1994, 99). Both kinds of theory are required for an ideological initiative to be thoughtful.

For the policy theory to be thoughtful, there must be a good reason, often based on formal analysis, to believe that a policy based on the theory will improve our situation (Munger 2000). Policy analyses supporting one or both (liberal and conservative) ideological positions are common and often constitute substantial literatures. Studies of the effectiveness of gun control laws, charter schools, health insurance, the minimum wage, tax policy, immigration policy, and international trade are only a few examples of sophisticated bodies of work on which entire academic careers are built. However, we must recall our variant of the Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey (1992) rule that ideology and self-interest drive analysis.

Value theories cannot be validated in a manner similar to policy theories. For the purposes of this study demonstrating moral thoughtfulness is only a matter of showing that policy makers have considered the moral implications of a policy and that values espoused are consistent with the priorities of equality, freedom, and order. This is a relatively low bar, but initiative advocates or opponents occasionally fail to meet it.

A policy theory describes how an objective will be accomplished. With public policy for business and economics the basic policy theory is market economics, a framework shared, with variations, by liberals and conservatives. For example, in the area of international trade, market theory specifies that the objective of high economic growth is accomplished in part by maximum international trade which translates into free trade with no tariffs, quotas, or hidden barriers such as subsidies. Ordinarily, a valid policy theory should be supported by data, and there is considerable evidence to show that free trade is widely beneficial and that increasing trade barriers hurts
many and helps only a few.

A moral/value theory specifies right or wrong, ethical or unethical, constructive or destructive. A policy theory must be at least loosely testable. A moral/value theory is based on value judgments. That is not to say that such a theory is a whim. To qualify as thoughtful a moral/value theory must be supported with more than a terse statement to the effect that X is right and Y is wrong. A moral/value theory must be part of a consistent framework of value preferences and priorities. For liberals and conservatives the JBG model and our modified market failure model summarize the core of that framework.

**Initiative effectiveness**

Objectively evaluating the effectiveness of an initiative is relatively easy, but there are at least three difficulties. First, differing ideological and self-interest perspectives can bias the analysis (Fischer 1995, 6; Munger 2000, 385-393). Second, even assuming that a policy analyst is the soul of objectivity, policy analysis can be methodologically difficult (Fischer 1995; Munger 2000). Third, initiative advocates sometimes turn against initiatives once they are implemented often because implementation reveals unanticipated side effects. To some degree, these problems can be side-stepped both by asking whether liberals believe that their initiatives have been effective, that is, achieved liberal objectives, and asking conservatives how they view liberal initiatives as achieving liberal objectives. Conservative initiatives can be evaluated similarly. The policy evaluations conducted by interest groups can also be enlightening especially when they disagree with their usual ideological allies.

We have observed every combination of liberals regarding their own initiatives as effective or not and conservatives disagreeing or agreeing and one or both sides changing their minds some years after an initiative has been implemented; the same applies to conservative initiatives. We describe ideological dissensus as well as consensus and movement toward one another’s policy positions elsewhere (Grafton & Permaloff 2001 & 2005) and in later chapters. Liberal-conservative agreement that a policy is effective does not
guarantee that it is, and one side’s view that the other’s policy is ineffective does not necessarily mean that it is ineffective. However, considerable light can be shed on public policy effectiveness by appraising the ideological self-examination and debate surrounding the policy together with analyses generated directly or indirectly by interest groups (who are less distracted by self-examination).

Occasionally, liberals turn against liberal initiatives. One example is the almost automatic support for increased spending on regular public schools that was a liberal article of faith in the 1960s. In that decade liberals were beginning to question the quality of some schools, but they still believed that the only significant problem was lack of funding which is to say that liberals largely regarded schools as effective: they were educating and socializing the young and providing opportunity for less affluent students. At that time conservatives argued that schools were not fully achieving these objectives, and that given the fact that some of the best funded schools in the nation were especially weak academically, schools generally did not deserve additional funding. Conservatives were essentially arguing that the liberal program of almost automatically increasing school funding at every opportunity was not achieving liberal educational objectives. As we will see in a later chapter, the conservative case was strengthened by poor scores on standardized tests, a result that the Times and Post dissected in numerous editorials critical of public schools. Simultaneously, disorder in some public schools was increasing, another weakness that our two liberal barometer newspapers discussed at considerable length. Slowly, by their own accounts, liberals saw that some public schools were ineffective. With declining enthusiasm for increased funding, liberals devoted years to such minutiae as hiring new school superintendents or reorganizing school bureaucracies. It is conceivable that the conservative initiative of competition via charter schools and vouchers helped to strengthen liberal critiques of regular public schools, but that is only speculation.

Just asking liberals in the early 1960s whether steadily increasing school funding was effective would have yielded an incorrect or at least misleading answer: liberal objectives were being met less and less even though liberals did not yet realize it. We know this because
in later years liberals became increasingly critical of regular public schools.

Turning to the example of liberal support for agribusiness subsidies, we will see that in the early 1960s liberals defended this initiative as effective even though they were unable to articulate clear objectives. Liberals believed that, for reasons they never made clear, the market economy was an excessively volatile environment for farmers and that the federal government needed to stabilize it. The myth of the family farm was interwoven into this economically questionable narrative. There was also the notion that farming was somehow different from other businesses because it was so basic to human existence. Even in the early 1960s liberals were not entirely happy with subsidy programs, but for many years they were satisfied with tweaking them. Meanwhile, conservatives criticized every part of the sentimental and theoretically unsound liberal narrative. Essentially, conservatives were saying that liberal objectives were vague and should be replaced by nothing more than feeding the country and perhaps growing surpluses that could be sold abroad.

Data documenting the shrinking number of family farms and the direct and indirect costs of subsidies perhaps helped along by conservative critiques pushed liberals to reject this initiative although they later supported it on pragmatic, grounds associated with the Food Stamp (SNAP) program. Again, the conservative opposition served as an early warning that subsidies were not meeting liberal objectives.

Changing liberal attitudes toward agribusiness subsidies and funding for regular public schools can be contrasted against unchanging liberal attitudes toward legalizing abortion and banning prayer in schools. A major difference is that liberals and conservatives regard these initiatives as effective even though they disagree on whether the initiatives should have been formulated and implemented. Aside from hiccups with prayer in schools (e.g., can the football team pray before a game), implementation at the federal level has been smooth. In the case of funding for public schools implementation began to break down. For many decades public schools were successful, but sometime in the 1950s they began
to deteriorate. With agribusiness subsidies, the policy theory never made sense and a large part of the objective contained a myth (the family farm) that was shrinking in importance. Even though the definition of effectiveness centers on achieving sponsors’ objectives, it is not enough to ask sponsors whether they regard initiatives as effective.

**Thoughtfulness and whether an initiative is effective and worthwhile**

Effective and worthwhile liberal or conservative initiatives require thoughtfulness. This means that there is a considered moral/value theory and a policy theory linking ideological values and the empirical world. Policy effectiveness and worthiness require both ideological consistency and thoughtfulness of both kinds. Failure is likely when ideological consistency or either kind of thoughtfulness is lacking.

Evaluating ideological consistency and moral/value and policy theory thoughtfulness to the satisfaction of all readers will be impossible. Neither liberalism nor conservatism are perfect logical structures against which we can compare behavior and precisely measure the consistency or inconsistency of behavior to ideological stricture. Nor will thoughtfulness or thoughtlessness on the part of ideologues or interest group leaders always be obvious. We will rely to a considerable extent on public debates among liberals, conservatives, and interest groups together with policy analysis in individual policy areas.

**Themes to Be Explored**

Virtually all policy initiatives considered in hearings of congressional committees in the past half century have been ideological initiatives although self-interest has probably played a more important role in what legislation is passed and in what form. An ideological initiative is a policy departure or an attempt to nullify an initiative of any origin that has been adopted by liberals or conservatives.

We are trying to understand some of the characteristics of ideological policy initiatives that have been effective and worthwhile. At the same time, we are trying to comprehend some of the dynamics
within and between liberalism and conservatism that have molded ideological initiatives. It seems likely that intra or inter ideological dynamics are related to the effectiveness and usefulness of policy initiatives. To review, what follows is a list of major themes and questions that we will be investigating throughout this study:

**Ideological consistency of initiatives.** Is a liberal initiative consistent with liberal core values and a conservative initiative consistent with conservative core values?

We will see that more often than not ideological initiatives are consistent with the sponsoring ideology’s core values. This is to be expected since liberalism and conservatism do not survive by regularly supporting initiatives inconsistent with their values. However, exceptions are sufficiently common and important to warrant attention. Ideological inconsistency constitutes a warning that something is basically wrong with an initiative (rendering it ineffective or not worth doing) or within liberalism or conservatism.

**Thoughtful ethical/value theory.** Is an initiative the product of a thoughtful ethical/value theory? That is, have ethical and value questions undergone some overt consideration?

This is not a high standard, but sometimes advocates launch initiative proposals with ethical or value positions assumed but not examined. As with ideological inconsistency, a thoughtless ethical/value theory is a warning that something is fundamentally wrong. Questions that will be pursued include: How can a thoughtless ethical/value theory develop? Of what importance are criticisms by opposing interest groups or ideologues?

**Thoughtful policy theory.** Is an initiative the product of a thoughtful policy theory? Is it based on a formal theory that maps a route from the present to an improved future? If not, opponents will nearly always highlight weaknesses. We also ask: How can thoughtless policy theories develop?

We describe patterns of decision making that commonly lead to the advocacy of thoughtless policy theories and other patterns that encourage the development of thoughtful policy theories. Over time, debates between competing ideologies strengthen an initiative and the political system as a whole.
Worthwhile initiatives. Is an initiative seen as worthwhile by the opposition?

Conservatives believe that many liberal initiatives are worthless or even destructive, and liberals hold the same attitude toward some conservative initiatives. This judgment does not mean that opponents are correct, but it highlights potential problems. In addition, with the passage of time ideologues sometimes turn against their own initiatives, providing a strong case that the initiative is not worthwhile.

Liberal-conservative dissensus or consensus. Does an initiative reflect complete liberal-conservative disagreement or is there partial agreement including agreement that develops over time as an initiative is implemented?

We cannot assume that liberal-conservative consensus means that an initiative is effective or worth doing, but agreement suggests something along those lines unless one is a radical or reactionary and outside the liberal-conservative political culture.

Ideological movement. How common is it for liberals to move rightward or conservative to move leftward? We will see that movement toward consensus is more frequent than many believe.

Interest group movement. How often do interest groups change positions? Aside from implementation details, interest groups rarely change positions. Self-interest tends to lock groups into fixed positions.

Divisions between ideologues and their usual interest group allies. How common is it for divisions to occur between ideologues and their usual interest group allies?

If interest group movement is rare as suggested by the previous point, divisions are most likely to occur when an ideological policy position changes, not when an interest group policy changes. Whatever its origins, disagreement between usual ideologue-interest group allies suggests that something is amiss.

Effectiveness of initiatives. Is a policy initiative effective, ineffective, or a mixture? According to whom? In a number of cases initiatives come to be regarded by their sponsors as ineffective, or at least less effective than first thought.
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